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Abstract 
In the Philippines, vegetable farmers generally have only small land holdings. 
Because of this, plus an apparent lack of financial capital, it is difficult for 
smallholder farmers to meet the large volume demands imposed by institutional 
buyers and wholesalers. The small volume and the large variation in quality puts 
smallholder farmers at a significant disadvantage when it comes to arranging 
transport and marketing. However, smallholder farmers can engage in collaborative 
cluster farming in order to meet the demands of the market and to bolster 
production volume. In the cluster, the farmers carry out production planning and 
marketing activities collectively. Utilizing the case study method and the 8-step 
clustering approach formulated by the Catholic Relief Services, this paper will 
present key success factors and several challenges faced by the Small Farmers 
Association of Quirogpang (SFAQ) in Marilog, Davao City, Philippines. At the same 
time, it will identify important institutional supports and strategies that may 
enhance the success of this and other clusters. The paper highlights key success 
factors such as the social connections shared by the cluster members and leadership. 
In this case, these commonalities exist because it is an area-based cluster which 
includes neighbours and relatives who all practice one religion and speak the same 
language or dialect. 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Vegetable farmers in the Philippines usually have very small farms. Because of 
this and the lack of financial capital, it is difficult for smallholder farmers to meet the 
quality and quantity demands of institutional market buyers and wholesalers. The low 
volume produced by a single farmer also puts them at a disadvantage in terms of transport 
and marketing.  
To participate in the emerging institutional market, these small farmers must learn 
to adjust or unify themselves in order to avoid further marginalization (Boselie, Henson 
and Weatherspoon, 2003). To compete and participate in modern markets, farmers often 
form collaborative marketing groups (CMGs). CMGs are groups of farmers who organize 
themselves to collectively sell their produce (Murray-Prior, 2008). This definition 
includes cooperatives, growers associations, cluster marketing groups and bargaining 
cooperatives. 
 
In Mindanao, there are several vegetable farmer groups that engage in clustering 
to market their products (Mendoza, 2006; Montiflor, 2007; Montiflor, Batt and Murray-
Prior, 2009). These include the Maragusan Vegetable Farmer’s Cluster, Northern 
Mindanao Vegetable Producers Association Inc. and the Vegetable Industry Council of 
Southern Mindanao Inc. Cluster farming is defined as having individual growers commit 
to the collective marketing of their products (Uy, 2005; Mendoza, 2006). 
In the cluster, the farmers collectively carry out production planning and 
marketing activities. A study of three clusters in Mindanao by Montiflor (2007) identified 
issues and challenges faced by farmer groups. These include the sustainability of financial 
support, the difficulty in sustaining active farmer members, encouraging farmers to 
cooperate once they are in a cluster, and the need for more farmer leaders.  
Montiflor, Batt and Murray-Prior (2009) identified two approaches to cluster 
farming: an area-based and a commodity-based approach. In the area-based approach, 
farmers group together based on the proximity of farms, while in the commodity-based 
approach, farmers plant the same vegetable and combine their output in order to achieve a 
higher volume. The area-based approach has more social connections, with neighbours 
and relatives often practicing the same religion and speaking the same language or dialect. 
Social connections present in the area-based approach are often found in subsistence or 
semi-subsistence communities (Montiflor et al., 2008).  
The case of the Small Farmers Association of Quirogpang (SFAQ) in Marilog is a 
prime example of an area-based approach. This paper will look into the key success 
factors and the challenges faced by cluster farmers in Quirogpang and identify what 
institutional support may be important for the cluster. 
 
Location of the Study 
Sitio Quirogpang is part of Barangay Marilog in Davao City, on the island of 
Mindanao in the Southern Philippines. The distance from Davao City to Marilog is 
approximately 51 km. The Barangay has a total land area of 17,833 ha and a population 
of 14,255 (in August 2007)(National Statistics Office, 2007). In 2007, the population of 
Sitio Quirogpang was only 225 residents who resided within 33 households.  
The only road from the nearest highway to Sitio Quirogpang is a rough dirt track, 
which often becomes impassable in wet weather. Although tomatoes are a suitable crop, 
given the high elevation, the roads are muddy and slippery, so it is difficult to transport 
fruit and other vegetables. Since the farm-to-market road is bad, the cost of transporting 
the vegetables is PhP 1/kg. Aside from vegetables, the main crops planted in the area 
include cocoa (10 ha) and coffee (7 ha). 
 
History of the Small Farmers Association of Quirogpang (SFAQ) 
The Small Farmers Association of Quirogpang (SFAQ) is the official name of the 
Quirogpang cluster. The SFAQ was originally an initiative of the People Collaborating 
for Environmental and Economic Management (PCEEM), Davao Foundation Inc. 
PCEEM evolved from a five year bilateral project jointly funded by the Philippine 
government through the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) and 
the Canadian government through the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA). 
In April 2006, PCEEM met with church leaders. One of the topics of the meeting 
was a proposal to include Quirogpang as one of the areas of PCEEM. That same month, 
 
Sitio Quirogpang church leader, Ms Jesebel Tugap, consulted with Quirogpang residents 
regarding the proposal.  
Most of the community welcomed the PCEEM project. PCEEM sought to 
investigate ways for the more sustainable management of the Talomo-Lipadas Watershed 
and the Davao River. The 24 farmers who agreed to support the PCEEM project were 
also the original members of SFAQ. Some of the assistance provided to the association 
included a seminar on natural farming and how to manage an association. The venue for 
these seminars was the parish church. 
In March 2007, the Paraiso Farmers’ Association (PFA) was formed in another 
Catholic parish church. SFAQ affiliated with the PFA and their leader, Ms. Tugap, was 
elected leader of PFA. The reason for the affiliation was the close proximity of Sitio 
Paraiso to the highway. Unlike Sitio Paraiso, Sitio Quirogpang is some 2-3 km away from 
the main highway, accessible only by horse, carabao (water buffalo) or by foot. It was 
easier to conduct activities and provide material support to Sitio Paraiso than to Sitio 
Quirogpang. 
PFA scheduled regular meetings on the first Saturday of every month. However, 
there were problems such as the long distance of the meeting area from Sitio Quirogpang, 
misunderstandings with the schedule and no clear agenda during meetings. Eventually, 
the Quirogpang group stopped coming to the meetings and the PFA membership 
dwindled. PCEEM staff, who originally assisted SFAQ and saw the group’s potential, 
introduced the Association to the Catholic Relief Services (CRS) in July 2007. 
CRS looked into the water supply and identified this as the main problem as the 
water was unsafe to drink. As a result, CRS (in coordination with PCEEM) constructed a 
water reservoir. Aside from the reservoir, seminars were conducted on vermiculture and 
veterinary related activities to take care of livestock. 
When PCEEM formally ended in April 2008, CRS continued to assist the group 
until June 2009, when CRS handed the group over to UP Mindanao.  
 
MATERIALS AND METHODS 
This is a case study which incorporates the process of data collection within the 8-
step clustering approach formulated by the Catholic Relief Services (CRS, 2007). The 
first five are preparatory activities (Figure 1). The approach focuses on improving 
marketing and production activities and involves farmers in a participatory action learning 
process. Step 1 is site selection, which includes identifying partners and forming working 
groups. Step 2 involves product supply assessment and selection, in which the key 
vegetables cultivated in the area are identified and potential focal vegetables selected. 
Step 3 entails a market survey, where farmers interview prospective buyers and visit 
institutional buyers such as supermarkets. Steps 4 and 5 are the cluster formation and 
planning stages. This involves the creation of an agro-enterprise plan for production and 
marketing. In Step 6, test marketing of the selected vegetable products is conducted, 
whereby the farmers send their produce to the identified buyer. Assuming it is successful, 
Step 7 is scaling up. During this stage, the farmers evaluate their test marketing and 
cluster performance and identify measures to improve the cluster and the members. In 
Step 8, the cluster may opt to review its enterprise plan or initiate the formation of new 
clusters. Baseline information was also gathered from 19 cluster members in 2008. Key 
informant interviews, trips reports and ocular observations were undertaken to enrich the 
data collection process and analysis. Both qualitative and quantitative analytical processes 
were used to analyse the data. 
 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUIROGPANG CLUSTER 
Based on the results of the baseline survey, informal interviews and observations, 
the common production and marketing problems were identified as: (1) very low market 
price/controlled price; (2) difficult farm access; (3) high cost of transport; (4) lack of 
access to capital; (5) high cost of fertilizers/pesticides; and (6) limited water supply. 
Environmental problems included landslides due to unprotected steep farm areas and poor 
road conditions that worsened during wet weather.  
During the database collection/product assessment stage (Step 2), the Quirogpang 
cluster listed the top 6 vegetables cultivated on the basis of volume. These included 
eggplants, squash, bitter gourd, Malabar spinach (alugbati), mungbean and string beans. 
The average monthly household income was only PhP 2,500, well below the poverty line.  
As part of an Agro-Enterprise planning workshop conducted in February 2009, 
farmers were exposed to potential markets. Farmers were able to interview institutional 
buyers and wet market buyers to obtain information on the market chain, varieties and 
quality. Farmers went to one large supermarket chain, one local supermarket chain and 
the Bankerohan wholesale market where they interviewed buyers. In the Bankerohan, the 
farmers were able to identify potential buyers, quality specifications, volume 
requirements and alternative modes of payment. Six buyers were identified in the 
Bankerohan. 
In their agro-enterprise plan, the farmers focused on producing three vegetables: 
squash (21,545 kg/year), eggplant (25,184 kg/year) and Malabar spinach (12,700 
kg/year). The management plan was for the cluster leader to contact the buyer at the 
Bankerohan. The assistant cluster leader was to manage the packing of the vegetables. 
The cluster decided, before the first delivery, to give 1% of the income they received to 
the cluster. 
During test marketing (Step 3), the crops sold included eggplant, sword pepper, 
Malabar spinach, Baguio beans, taro, banana, okra, bitter gourd, sweet potato and sponge 
gourd. The agreement was that the buyer would order what kind and volume of 
vegetables they required every Wednesday. On Thursday, a price range would be sent to 
the cluster to assist them in deciding whether they would accept the prices offered. On 
Friday, the vegetables would be collected and paid for. The prices paid for the vegetables 
ultimately depended on the quality of the vegetables as defined by the buyer. The 
institutional buyer was to pay the cluster in cash after each transaction. 
On the day of delivery, the cluster farmers brought their vegetables to the sorting 
shed provided by the Catholic Relief Services (CRS). The vegetables brought in were 
weighed and recorded. There was no quality control as all the vegetables brought in by 
the farmers were accepted. The cluster promised to pay an average price for all of the 
vegetables, so the farmers had some idea how much they should receive. The vegetables 
were then transported via horses to the highway. At the highway, the institutional buyer 
weighed and classified the vegetables and paid the cluster leader for that produce which 
they accepted. 
After test marketing, the farmers complained that the communication/transaction 
system that was agreed to during the negotiation had not been followed. The institutional 
buyer had not been providing prices earlier than Friday, arguing in their defence that they 
had to check the prices at Crossing S and in the Bankerohan. However, for one cluster in 
Maragusan, Compostela Valley, supported by UP Mindanao, the institutional buyer was 
sending information on the volume required and the prices of each vegetable as agreed.  
 
On the other hand, the buyer complained that the cluster did not provide the 
agreed volume of vegetables. This was a problem for the buyer since they had travelled 
specifically to pick up the vegetables promised by the cluster. It was costly for them if 
they arrived at the pick-up area and did not get the volume and variety of products they 
had ordered. 
There was also some disagreement about the quality of the products delivered. The 
buyer stipulated what they called Class A quality vegetables. However, the characteristics 
of Class A quality vegetables were not accurately described.   
Another issue was the calibration of the scales, with the total weight measured by 
the cluster’s scale being slightly higher than for the buyer’s scale. As the buyer’s scale 
was being used to determine the total volume and value, this presented a problem because 
the cluster’s record of weight was used to pay the farmers. To ensure that cluster 
members made subsequent deliveries, the cluster leader paid the full amount to the 
farmers based on the cluster weighing scale. As a result, the cluster had to absorb the loss. 
Furthermore, those vegetables which did not pass the standards of the institutional buyer 
were sold in the Bankerohan for a lower price.  
Although the farmers were getting a better price from the institutional buyer 
compared to selling at Crossing S, they were still unhappy. The farmers received PhP 
14/kg for eggplant while the price in Crossing S was only PhP 10/kg. Aside from 
eggplant, the farmers also received a better price for Malabar spinach and sword pepper. 
The price of sword pepper, for example, was 50% higher than at Crossing S (Table 1). 
Farmers appeared to be hoping that they would get the prices paid by buyers in the 
Bankerohan, but they failed to allow for the cost of transport to the Bankerohan. In 
addition, the agro-enterprise plan had raised their expectations by including unrealistic 
projections of prices. Farmers failed to consider the risks associated with having to take 
whatever price was offered once their vegetables reached the Bankerohan market. It also 
appeared that they were able to sell a wider range of vegetables than at Crossing S. 
At present, with the facilitation of the UP Mindanao project team, the cluster and 
the institutional buyers are still transacting and looking for some means to address the 
issues. Limited market options have forced the farmers to continue to transact with the 
institutional buyer and to sell to wholesalers in the Bankerohan (Figure 2).  
The farmers usually have local buyers from Crossing S. A local buyer is one who 
supplies a mall in Tagum City or Davao City. There are also buyers/traders who regularly 
come to Crossing S to buy vegetables brought in by the farmers. Some farmers from 
Quirogpang opt to take their produce to the Bankerohan public market themselves and to 
sell to that buyer who offers the best price. 
From February 2009 to January 2010, an estimated 5,866 kg of assorted 
vegetables were produced by the cluster (Table 2). The total value amounted to PhP 
59,992. From August 2009 to January 2010, the cluster sold vegetables to the institutional 
market ten times and to the Bankerohan public market. The largest volume was delivered 
to the Bankerohan (71%). However, in terms of value, sales to the Bankerohan provided 
only 58% of the total amount received by the cluster.  
There is also a local buyer whom the cluster previously sold to when they were 
still transacting as individual farmers. This local buyer pays a higher price in comparison 
to the prevailing price at Crossing S. This local buyer was not concerned about quality 
and purchased almost all of the vegetables brought in by cluster members.  
 
 
CHANGES AND CHALLENGES ARISING FROM CLUSTER ACTIVITIES 
The farmers continue to sell vegetables to the institutional buyer and to the public 
market. The supermarket is satisfied with the consistency of supply and the quality so 
they continue to order from the farmers. The farmers are also aware that the institutional 
market cannot accept all the produce that they grow and so they must sell some to local 
buyers and wholesalers in the wet market. However, this has not discouraged them from 
supporting their collaborative marketing group. This option has created an alternative 
market for the farmers’ produce and improved their understanding of how market prices 
are derived. Each farmer within the cluster is entitled to voice his or her opinion during 
meetings and gatherings which enhances the richness of experiences and ideas.  
There are several issues and challenges faced by the Quirogpang cluster. These 
include: (i) the need for additional volume and a greater product assortment; (ii) problems 
in negotiating with the institutional buyer over quality standards; (iii) problems with 
calibration of scales; (iv) the inability of farmers to calculate the farm-gate price; and (v) 
inaccessible farm-to-market roads.  
Some of the possible interventions are to have a third party calibrate the weighing 
scales used by both the buyer and the cluster. This will address complaints from both 
parties as to whose scale is most accurate. There should also be some dialogue to discuss 
the quality specifications of the buyer. One way to start the discussion may be to use the 
quality specifications as utilised by another institutional buyer as a guide. If both the 
buyer and the farmers agree on the quality standards, haggling over quality during 
delivery will be curtailed and both will benefit from the transaction. The buyer will get 
the desired quality while the farmers will receive a fair price. 
At present, the vegetables chosen by the farmers are the tropical varieties such as 
squash, eggplant, Malabar spinach and bitter gourd as the farmers are more familiar with 
the production protocols for these vegetables. Although the City Agriculturist’s Office 
has provided temperate vegetable seeds such as carrots and lettuce, the farmers have yet 
to plant these vegetables. The main reason is that these crops are new to them and they 
have little to no experience. Furthermore, Quirogpang farmers cannot afford to conduct 
trials because most of them are self-financed. They have limited money to invest in 
vegetable production. Therefore, they need to have access to capital or to be provided 
with some loan assistance from support organisations. 
 
KEY LESSONS AND SUCCESS FACTORS 
Key success factors for the cluster are having: (1) alternative markets; (2) strong 
leadership; (3) open communication; (4) trust; (5) social connections; and (6) strong 
institutional support. 
Institutional support has been crucial to the success of this cluster, just as it was 
for three other clusters in Northern and Southern Mindanao (Montiflor, 2007). This 
support includes on-going training, workshops and field visits for vegetable production, 
post-harvest training and marketing. For SFAQ, aside from the market linkages, they also 
received support from other government and non-government agencies. CRS-PCEEM 
provided them with a water reservoir and CRS initially provided field officer support and 
also provided the sorting shed. UP Mindanao provided support from a field officer plus 
material support for a sorting shed which also doubles as a waiting shed at Crossing S. 
Other support includes seeds, fertilizers, crates and seed trays from the Department of 
Agriculture through the Davao City Agriculturist’s Office (CAO).  
 
Cluster cohesion is enhanced by the social connections between its members. 
Most of the members belong to the same family, the same church group and speak the 
same language. The cluster leader and officers are in constant contact with the members 
and members give feedback for any improvements or problems to be addressed. Leaders 
were chosen by the farmers themselves and not by outsiders. There is trust among the 
members since they handed over the responsibility of collating, selling and negotiating 
the sale of the vegetables to one person.  
In the SFAQ, it was noted that 14 out of the 19 members belong to three families. 
In one family, there were ten cluster members. This included the parents, sons, daughters, 
in-laws and cousins. The other two families were composed of brothers. Most of the 
members also speak Cebuano and the cluster members belong to the Gagmay’ng 
Kristohanong Katilingban (GKK) or Small Christian Communities, a Catholic Church. 
Lin (1999) said that those networks that are closer and have more intimate and reciprocal 
relations, such as family and relatives, may encourage others to join and protect existing 
resources.  
The cluster has a strong leader who the members trust. The cluster leader is also a 
GKK and Purok Leader. She is the major motivator of the cluster activities and the 
members place a high degree of trust in her. She represents the cluster at numerous 
meetings and workshops and negotiates directly with the buyers. 
Trust is one of the most important factors that strengthen collaboration (Batt and 
Purchase, 2004). Personal and process-based trust is very important in a collaborative 
relationship (Kotilla and Ronni, 2008). However, building collaborative relationships is 
often difficult (Dunne 2008). Time, resources and management skill have been invested 
over some time to develop this trust.  
As Sitio Quirogpang is inaccessible by most motor vehicles, the roads are bad, the 
distance from the highway is long and tedious, the population is small, and the area is 
quite isolated, people living there tend to help each other. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the case of SFAQ, there are several key success factors and challenges for the 
cluster. Positive factors include: 
 high levels of social capital and effective leadership 
 strong institutional support 
 a committed institutional buyer 
 strong social connections 
 a high degree of trust towards the cluster leader 
Issues to be addressed include: 
 the need to standardise quality standards 
 the need to standardise weighing scales 
 an improved understanding of market prices and the calculation of 
farm-gate prices 
 access to capital 
 landslides due to unprotected steep farm areas and poor road 
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Table 1: Test marketing volume and value of institutional market 














Eggplant 48 14.00 672 10.00 
Sweet potato 48 7.50 360  
Banana 36 4.00 144 4.00 
Baguio beans 23 20.00 460 20.00 
Malabar spinach 22 8.00 173 4.00 
Taro 15 7.50 113  
Sword pepper 10 23.00 230 15.00 
Sponge gourd 9 5.00 45  
Okra 6 10.00 60  
Bitter gourd 2 20.00 40  
Total 219  2, 296  
 
Table 2: Volume, value and buyers of vegetables produced by SFAQ 
(August 09 – January 10) 
 
Buyer Times Volume Value 
 bought Kg % PhP % 
Institutional buyer 10 1,601 27% 20,643 34% 
Bankerohan market 10 4,149 71% 34,865 58% 
Rizal Park Davao City 1 No data  2,144 4% 
Local buyer 1 117 2% 2,340 4% 
Total  5,866  59,992  
 
Figure 1: CRS 8-step approach to clustering approach 





Figure 2: Vegetable supply chains of Sitio Quirogpang cluster 
 
 
